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Death Penalty Administration: A Response to 
Alexandra Klein’s Nondelegating Death 
ERIC BERGER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Alexandra Klein’s excellent new article, Nondelegating Death, 
makes an important and original contribution. State method-of-execution 
statutes, she points out, afford very broad discretion to administrative agencies 
to craft and implement execution protocols.1 These statutes, she argues, raise 
questions under states’ nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines. 
Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has not vindicated a federal nondelegation 
doctrine challenge since the mid-1930s,2 state courts apply the doctrine on a 
regular basis. Death row inmates, therefore, should consider the nondelegation 
doctrine when they challenge state execution protocols, and we all should keep 
the doctrine in mind when evaluating state execution practices.  
Klein’s article is insightful. State administration of the death penalty is often 
haphazard and appalling. The litany of errors is chilling. State departments of 
corrections (DOCs) employ unqualified executioners, use the wrong drug 
during executions, and select lethal injection protocols that greatly heighten the 
risk of excruciating pain. Unsurprisingly, states have visibly botched several 
executions in recent years. It is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that they 
have inflicted excruciating pain in many more executions; because many state 
protocols have included a paralytic, it is impossible to know how many inmates 
have died an excruciating death. 
State agencies make these errors in part because state legislatures’ broad 
delegations permit them to do so. Klein contends that to understand and reduce 
that risk, we must look to top-level legislative decisions that entrust so much 
authority to inexpert DOC officials. State legislators pass the buck to 
unqualified, inexpert state correctional officials. Judges confronted with these 
cases, Klein concludes, should “offer[] a stronger nondelegation analysis for 
method of execution statutes.” 
 
  Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of 
Law. I thank Alex Klein for very helpful comments and for the invitation to write this 
Response to her great Article. Thanks also to Meagan Diamond, Jared Connors, and the other 
editors of the Ohio State Law Journal for excellent editorial assistance. 
 1 See Alexandra L. Klein, Nondelegating Death, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 923 (2020). 
 2 See generally Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
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Professor Klein builds her case very well, and she identifies many deep 
flaws underlying state methods of execution. However, whereas Professor Klein 
views the state administration of execution protocols primarily through the lens 
of the nondelegation doctrine, I tend to think that we should understand those 
same problems with reference to a wider range of administrative law doctrines 
and norms. While the nondelegation norms Klein explores are a factor, they are, 
by my lights, just one small piece of a bigger puzzle. 
This Response to Professor Klein’s generative article considers the various 
administrative law norms and doctrines implicated by the problems she cogently 
explores. My Response concurs with Klein that state DOCs’ implementation of 
the death penalty is deeply problematic. It also agrees that state legislatures have 
often delegated a great deal of authority over execution protocols and that some 
states’ nondelegation doctrines provide a plausible litigation hook for mounting 
challenges to those protocols. However, the nondelegation issue is just one of 
several administrative problems that often bedevil state lethal injection 
procedures. This Response focuses on the other administrative problems. To 
that end, my Response should be understood not as criticism but rather as a 
friendly amendment. 
Indeed, Professor Klein and I agree on far more than we disagree. In my 
view, she focuses on the crucial issue: the (often neglected) administrative 
failings underlying state lethal injection procedures. I would contend, in fact, 
that one cannot understand lethal injection problems without an administrative 
law lens. Reasonable people can disagree about the moral propriety of capital 
punishment, but no one should be comfortable with inexpert, untrained 
personnel designing and implementing needlessly excruciating execution 
protocols which rely on dangerous drugs and quasi-medical techniques they do 
not understand. This insight is central to understanding lethal injection today, 
and a majority of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have failed to grapple with 
it.3 
Part I of this Response agrees with Klein that many states’ administration 
of the death penalty is problematic but raises some concerns about relying too 
heavily on the nondelegation doctrine. Part II contends that the problems with 
lethal injection implicate a wider range of administrative law concerns. 
Attention to these issues helps us better understand the deep systemic failures 
with state execution methods. The Response concludes by observing that 
administrative law issues shed light on not just problematic execution methods 
but on broader problems with our prison and criminal justice systems. 
 
 3 See generally Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019); Glossip v. Gross, 135 
S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
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II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND EXECUTION METHODS 
The federal nondelegation doctrine has been extremely deferential for 
almost a century. Under current doctrine, if Congress chooses to delegate its 
legislative authority to an administrative agency, it must provide that agency 
with an “intelligible principle” to guide its action. In practice, since the mid-
1930s, the Supreme Court has upheld all delegations no matter how broad or 
vague the “intelligible principle.” As Professor Chemerinsky explains, this 
deference “reflects a judicial judgment that broad delegations are necessary in 
the complex modern world and that the judiciary is ill-equipped to draw 
meaningful lines.”4 
Professor Klein demonstrates, however, that state nondelegation doctrines 
are different. Though conceptually similar, these state doctrines tend to be more 
robust. State constitutions, after all, differ from the federal one and from each 
other, and some states’ separations-of-powers principles require that delegations 
to state agencies provide more detailed instructions than we often find at the 
federal level. 
Of course, it is possible that federal nondelegation doctrine will become less 
deferential in the near future. In Gundy v. United States, the Court’s 
participating conservative Justices all signaled a willingness to revisit the 
doctrine. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, 
wrote a dissent criticizing the “intelligible principles misadventure.” Justice 
Alito concurred in the judgment but also signaled his interest in reevaluating the 
nondelegation doctrine. Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in Gundy, but he 
too has indicated that he would be open to reevaluating the nondelegation 
doctrine, especially in cases involving Congress’s authority to delegate “major 
policy questions” to administrative agencies. 
It is not hard to count to five and conclude that change could be on the way.5 
Congress’s unfettered authority to delegate problems to administrative agencies 
may soon be a thing of the past. Depending on how the Court framed a future 
opinion, such a decision potentially could call into question the constitutionality 
of dozens of administrative agencies and thousands of agency actions. Of 
course, the Court instead could send a more modest shot across Congress’s bow, 
signaling that Congress ought to delegate with moderately greater specificity 
while taking care to preserve existing statutory and regulatory law, as well as 
the structure of contemporary American government. 
Chief Justice Roberts, in particular, often gravitates towards judicial 
minimalism and may be reluctant to join too disruptive an opinion. The Chief 
 
4 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 354 
(2019).  
 5 Justice Ginsburg died as this Response was going to press. Obviously, her 
replacement’s views will also factor into this doctrine’s future.  
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Justice, and possibly other conservatives, may be more inclined to issue a 
decision along the lines of something like Lopez v. United States. That decision 
was notable in that it marked the first time in nearly sixty years that the Supreme 
Court held that a federal statute had exceeded Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause. At the time, it seemed like a big deal. In retrospect, though, 
Lopez was a rather limited decision. Yes, it reined in Congress’s authority a tad, 
but it seems to offer Congress drafting instructions more than a strict prohibition 
on the kinds of legislation it can pass.6 To be sure, subsequent opinions chipped 
away a little more at Congress’s Commerce Clause power,7 but, all in all, the 
doctrinal revisions have been modest, not momentous—at least so far. A change 
to the federal nondelegation doctrine might operate similarly. 
That said, it is certainly possible that today’s conservative Court could 
change the nondelegation doctrine (and, for that matter, the Commerce Clause, 
too) more dramatically, either immediately or over time. If it did, such a move 
could call into question large sectors of the federal government and result in 
legal and structural chaos. After all, as one of the leading casebooks on 
administrative law puts it: “Modern government is administrative government. 
Much of modern life is a product, in large part, of the activities of government 
agencies.”8 Were the Court to hold or imply that some or many administrative 
agencies were unconstitutional because Congress had not delegated to them 
with sufficient specificity, huge swaths of American law might be challenged as 
null and void, resulting in widespread legal, political, and economic chaos. This 
extreme outcome might be unlikely, but it is not altogether implausible. 
I do not favor these doctrinal changes, but that does not mean I believe that 
the administrative state is problem free. Rather, I suggest that the nondelegation 
doctrine, which could imply the illegitimacy of administrative action writ large, 
is the wrong mechanism to address agency abuses. For one, Congress needs to 
delegate and do so broadly because it has no other choice. It lacks the time, 
expertise, and resources to manage closely the thousands of problems and policy 
issues facing the nation.9 The Court itself has explained that “Congress simply 
 
 6 Lopez, for instance, signaled that when Congress legislates pursuant to its 
commerce authority, it should include a jurisdictional element and Congressional findings 
demonstrating how the regulated conduct substantially affected interstate commerce. 
 7 See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–61 (2012); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–19 (2000). 
 8 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 1 (8th ed. 2017). 
 9 Of course, the legal arguments for and against a more robust nondelegation doctrine 
do not turn solely on the practicalities. For an excellent article contending that the original 
constitutional understanding permitted broad Congressional delegations, see generally Julian 
Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. – 
(forthcoming 2021), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3512154. 
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cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.” To this Professor Strauss adds persuasively that “given the 
limitations of language, of human foresight, and of the time available for the 
task, no single institution could be expected to provide in detail for all the 
matters warranting ‘legislative’ attention in a complex society.”10 Quite simply, 
for the country to function, Congress needs to delegate and needs broad 
authority to do so.11 The same is likely true at the state level, albeit probably to 
a somewhat lesser extent. 
Revival of the nondelegation doctrine is problematic, then, because it could 
limit legislatures’ authority to delegate complicated policy problems to 
administrative agencies. While the doctrine’s proponents seem to think that a 
change along these lines might force Congress to do its job, it seems far more 
likely that the nation will handle many crucial problems even more inadequately 
than it already does. Governing such a large, complex society intelligently is 
already extremely difficult. Without energetic administrative agencies, it would 
likely be impossible. 
To the extent some administrative action is incompetent, arbitrary, abusive, 
inefficient, or otherwise troublesome, other administrative norms and doctrines 
are a better way to address problems. Unlike the nondelegation doctrine, most 
other administrative law mechanisms do not call into question the very 
legitimacy of the administrative state. Rather, they focus instead on particular 
agency actions, requiring agencies to follow proper administrative norms and 
procedures. They are granular, not global. 
Professor Klein is certainly correct that state nondelegation doctrines are 
distinct from the federal doctrine. The reliance on a state nondelegation doctrine 
to challenge state method of execution practices, then, would not necessarily 
portend a change to the federal doctrine. But though they are separate bodies of 
law, federal and state law can inform each other, and trends in one system can 
influence the other.12 More importantly, while state legislatures’ tasks are less 
 
 10 PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 11 Probably needless to say, judges and commentators disagree vehemently on the 
wisdom and constitutionality of our administrative state. Gary Lawson’s recent thought-
provoking article in support of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine is one example of 
thoughtful scholarship on the other side of these debates. 
 12 To offer one example, when the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a federal 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, it included an appendix 
listing state and federal judicial decisions addressing the issue under either federal or state 
constitutional law. The state court decisions construing state constitutional law were 
obviously not binding on the U.S. Supreme Court in its interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution, but the Court nevertheless found them relevant as “reflect[ing] the more 
general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the 
past decades.” While the nondelegation doctrine raises different kinds of concerns, the 
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overwhelming than Congress’s, they too cannot handle everything on their plate 
without delegating some authority. Too robust a state nondelegation doctrine 
could unnecessarily hamper effective state governance. After all, “[m]odern 
government is administrative government.” 13 
Relatedly, as Klein acknowledges herself, it may not be realistic to require 
much greater legislative specificity. The line between policymaking, which is a 
legislative function, and policy implementation, which is administrative, is, at 
best, blurry. Too robust a nondelegation doctrine would force courts to draw 
arbitrary lines between policymaking and policy implementation. Such a task 
would be nearly impossible for judges to handle well, and it would also yield 
significant uncertainty at the policy level. 
At a more pragmatic level, death penalty states would undoubtedly 
complain, with some justification, that more specific method-of-execution 
legislation would deny them the flexibility they need to change protocols 
without new legislation. Over the past decade, drug shortage issues have forced 
some states to switch protocols. While death penalty opponents relish any 
obstacle that makes it harder for states to resume executions, courts might not 
want to forbid delegations that would make it hard for states to carry out death 
sentences without new legislation every time the existing protocol hit a snag. 
After all, if state legislatures have already approved capital punishment, it seems 
needlessly burdensome to require them also to approve method-of-execution 
revisions. Courts might not find these practicability concerns decisive, but I 
suspect many would find them persuasive. 
There are also questions about the degree of specificity we want to require 
of legislatures, both in the method-of-execution context and more generally. We 
should certainly require state legislatures to select whether to have capital 
punishment. It is also fair to ask them to identify the general method (e.g., lethal 
injection, firing squad, etc.). It is less clear that state legislatures possess the 
expertise, time, and resources to select protocol details intelligently. Do we 
really want state legislatures deciding the drug dosages, the layout of the 
execution chamber, or the contingency plans should problems arise? It is 
unlikely that state legislatures would deal with these problems any more 
competently than state correctional departments have. If anything, given their 
other commitments and political pressures, it seems quite possible legislatures 
would do an even worse job. 
Professor Klein deserves great credit for her thorough and intelligent study 
casting light on delegation concerns. States often do delegate broad authority to 
agencies to carry out executions, and they offer those agencies minimal 
 
Supreme Court could plausibly find relevant how state systems and the public more generally 
perceive the administrative state. 
 13 BREYER ET AL., supra note 8, at 1. 
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guidance. However, as I shall argue in the next section, state practices also 
implicate other administrative law issues. To that extent, I tend to view the broad 
delegation of authority as part of a wider array of administrative shortcomings. 
 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS WITH STATE EXECUTION 
METHODS 
Because Professor Klein provides a thorough examination of states’ broad 
delegation of execution protocols, I will focus instead on other administrative 
problems that plague state execution procedures. Litigants might use these 
shortcomings to challenge state protocols on state administrative law grounds 
or to argue that states do not deserve deference in cases involving the Eighth 
Amendment or other constitutional challenges. Collectively, these factors make 
clear that states administer their execution protocols with an alarming lack of 
professionalism. 
The factors fall into three general categories: political accountability, 
expertise, and procedural regularity. Political accountability factors speak to 
agencies’ primary weakness, namely their lack of democratic legitimacy. While 
agencies’ democratic legitimacy will generally compare unfavorably to elected 
legislatures, the degree of accountability they enjoy can vary depending on a 
variety of factors (including the terms of the statutory delegation). Expertise, by 
contrast, speaks to agencies’ primary strength: their detailed understanding of 
specialized problems. Finally, procedural regularity can help ensure that 
agencies do not enjoy standardless discretion, unsettle reliance interests, and 
unduly tread on individual rights. 
Admittedly, these factors are complicated. An important advantage of 
Professor Klein’s approach, then, is that it will usually require fewer judicial 
resources, as courts under her approach would apply one administrative law 
doctrine rather than several. Nevertheless, the following discussion 
demonstrates why some of the administrative issues bedeviling state execution 
protocols are analytically distinct from each other and therefore difficult to 
address entirely under a single doctrinal rubric. 
A. Political Accountability 
We start with factors implicating political accountability. The 
nondelegation doctrine, of course, is one of these. One of that doctrine’s core 
concerns is that legislatures will relinquish their constitutional authority to make 
the law. When legislatures abdicate this authority, it raises problems implicating 
both democracy and separation of powers. Excessive delegation raises 
democracy concerns, because administrative officials are usually unelected and 
therefore far less politically accountable than elected legislators. It raises 
separation-of-powers concerns to the extent that it sometimes asks executive 
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officials to assume the legislative task of creating the law, a task state 
constitutions usually entrust to legislatures alone. 
As Klein explains, the degree of legislative specificity is an important factor 
in determining whether agency action is politically accountable. If the 
legislature does not give sufficient instructions to the implementing agency, then 
the connection between the agency and the electorate, tenuous to begin with, 
might be altogether lacking. An agency’s political accountability, then, hinges 
in part on the details of the legislative instructions. 
The nondelegation doctrine, however, is not the only relevant facet of an 
agency’s political accountability. Oversight and transparency matter, too. Once 
a legislature delegates authority to an agency, it can maintain some degree of 
political accountability by proper oversight. Ideally, this oversight will involve 
both external review of the agency (so that the elected legislature and governor 
will keep tabs on how the agency does its job) and intra-agency review (so that 
the agency leaders, who are more directly accountable to elected officials, will 
monitor lower level employees to make sure they carry out policies carefully 
and correctly). 
Agency transparency is also an important factor in determining agency 
accountability. If agencies operate in secret, the people and their elected 
representatives cannot know what government is doing. Inadequate 
transparency, thus, undermines political accountability. 
In the lethal injection context, the various accountability factors each 
militate against deference to state correctional departments. As Klein 
demonstrates, state legislatures often delegate at very broad level of generality 
without any real detail to guide agencies. Nor do state governors or legislatures 
closely monitor how correctional departments design and carry out their 
execution protocols. To the contrary, most are happy to wash their hands of the 
unpleasant business. And many state legislatures compound these problems by 
passing broad secrecy statutes that insulate state execution protocols from any 
transparency that might shed light on state malfeasance or incompetence.14 
To be sure, states are not identical, and some may rate higher than others in 
particular metrics. By and large, however, state execution practices are marked 
by a lack of political accountability. In other words, the usual concerns about 
the administrative state are, if anything, even stronger in this setting. 
For my purposes here, it is important to point out that oversight and 
transparency are related to but analytically distinct from delegation. Agencies 
 
 14 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BEHIND THE CURTAIN: SECRECY AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 32–45 (2018), 
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf; Eric 
Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 
1388–92 (2014). 
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might have concrete marching orders from legislatures but still act in secrecy 
and with minimal oversight. The other side of the coin can also be true: agencies 
might lack clear guidance from legislatures but still report their work 
transparently to elected officials, who in turn monitor agency actions regularly. 
Of course, as Klein suggests, vague legislative instructions may often be 
interconnected with these other accountability shortcomings. A legislature that 
delegates open-ended authority may be more prone to neglect its oversight 
responsibilities. But this is not necessarily the case. To this extent, the 
nondelegation doctrine gets at one, but only one, important facet of an agency’s 
political accountability. 
B. Expertise 
If agencies’ lack of political accountability is one of their frequent 
shortcomings, their expertise should usually work in their favor.15 After all, 
agencies usually enjoy a specialized epistemic authority over technical and 
complicated policy areas that the legislature lacks. That usual expertise, 
however, frequently has been absent in the lethal injection sphere. 
State officials often lack a basic understanding of the execution protocols 
they design and implement. They sometimes do not understand the risks of the 
drugs they select. They also often delegate lethal injection protocols down the 
chain of command to other employees who lack the medical training to 
understand how to inject those drugs without causing excruciating pain. In at 
least one instance, state officials actually injected the wrong drug during an 
execution. 
Professor Klein reminds us that courts in this area show “unwarranted 
reliance on agency expertise.” I agree entirely. However, whereas Klein situates 
the discussion of expertise in the context of nondelegation doctrine analysis, I 
tend to think the lack of expertise is mostly independent of the nondelegation 
doctrine.16 Even the clearest legislative instructions will do little to cure 
problems resulting from a lack of agency expertise. Indeed, such epistemic 
shortcomings might compromise agencies’ abilities to comply with those very 
instructions. 
Consequently, epistemic shortcomings should affect judicial analysis in 
many kinds of cases challenging state execution protocols, not just cases 
involving the nondelegaton doctrine. A court, for instance, should offer less 
deference to a state execution protocol facing an Eighth Amendment challenge 
if the record demonstrates that state doesn’t know what it’s doing. Similarly, 
even where the delegating statute contains clear instructions, a court should not 
 
 15 See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 19 (1985). 
 16 In fairness, Professor Klein herself notes that “[a]gency competence is a distinct, 
but interrelated issue from nondelegation.” Klein, supra note 1, at 969. 
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defer to an agency that fails to examine the relevant facts thoroughly. 
Indeed, problems of epistemic authority and nondelegation fundamentally 
address different concerns. Inadequate delegation exacerbates an agency’s 
primary weakness: its lack of political accountability. To the extent that 
legislatures have no choice but to leave details to agencies, administrative 
agencies necessarily will have some freedom to maneuver with minimal 
political accountability. The question raised by the nondelegation doctrine is, in 
essence, how little legislative input is too little. 
By contrast, if an agency acts without expertise or thoroughness, it 
undercuts its primary strength. An agency operating without expertise or 
thorough consideration does not necessarily cut itself off from democratic 
actors, but it does undermine its own raison d’être. Why should we allow an 
agency to act unless it is doing something that the legislature could not do itself? 
Epistemic shortcomings, then, are distinct from inadequate legislative 
delegations. A comprehensive statutory delegation may easily satisfy 
nondelegation doctrine concerns, but if the agency at issue lacks expertise and 
care, we can expect both legal and policy problems. While courts considering 
state execution practices should keep all these issues in mind, they should also 
remember that these matters are analytically and doctrinally distinct. 
C. Procedural Regularity 
Finally, courts considering these issues should also examine whether the 
agencies responsible for administering the death penalty are acting with 
procedural regularity. Procedural rules serve yet another function in 
administrative government. Relatively formalized procedures, like notice-and-
comment rulemaking, helps check agencies’ administrative discretion, thereby 
helping to protect private reliance interests and individual liberties. Agencies 
that follow regular procedures are less likely to engage in arbitrary abuses of 
power than those that abandon standard procedures and act on the fly without 
careful deliberation and reasoned explanation. 
Once again, the nondelegation doctrine is related to but distinct from these 
issues. A state might delegate clear and precise instructions to an agency, 
satisfying nondelegation doctrine requirements under even the strictest versions 
of that doctrine. The agency, however, still owes careful, predictable procedures 
to the public and the individuals whose lives it affects. For example, when the 
legislature delegates rulemaking authority to an agency, even clear legislative 
instructions cannot absolve that agency from following the required processes 
for promulgating new rules. Indeed, these rulemaking requirements have real 
bite. Federal courts do not strike down broad delegations to agencies under 
current doctrine, but they do often find agency action lacking for failure to 
follow proper administrative procedures. These holdings constrain 
administrative discretion, but not through the nondelegation doctrine. 
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Admittedly, procedural rules operate differently in the death penalty context 
than in most administrative settings. Several states have exempted their method-
of-execution protocols from ordinary administrative law and disclosure 
requirements. To that extent, many states have made it much harder to challenge 
state execution protocols on administrative law grounds, such as the failure to 
employ notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, in states without such 
provisions, some courts have struck down execution protocols precisely because 
the state failed to follow its own administrative procedures.17 
Even where a state has exempted its protocol from ordinary administrative 
law, however, it is worth noting that these administrative law factors can still 
have traction in constitutional cases. Where states have failed to follow basic 
administrative law norms in designing execution protocols, courts hearing 
Eighth Amendment challenges ought not defer to the states.18 After all, states 
themselves have demonstrated that they often lack the expertise to design and 
carry out executions safely. By skipping notice-and-comment rulemaking, states 
also deprive themselves the opportunity to receive input from outsiders with 
expertise. The result is likely a less professional, more dangerous execution 
protocol. 
Of course, the factors here are connected in some ways to nondelegation 
concerns. For example, Chenery requires that administrative orders be upheld 
on the grounds upon which the agency relied in exercising its powers in the first 
place. As Kevin Stack has explained, this requirement forces agencies to justify 
their actions in terms of the initial statutory delegation, thereby reinforcing the 
agency’s democratic legitimacy. To this extent, concerns about procedural 
regularity intersect with the nondelegation doctrine. Once again, though, they 
are separate doctrines, drawing on different precedents and serving distinct, 
albeit interrelated, purposes in our administrative law. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: THE FAILURES OF THE PRISON SYSTEM 
The problems considered briefly here help us understand the deep problems 
with lethal injection today. Part of the problem, as Klein argues, is that state 
legislatures have delegated vast and standardless discretion to state agencies. 
There are other problems, though. Once legislatures delegate these matters, they 
wash their hands of them, unwilling to oversee the problems for which they are 
 
 17 See Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 732–33 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008); Evans v. Maryland, 914 A.2d 25, 80–81 (Md. 2006); Smith v. Montana, No. 
2008-303, slip op. at 11 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015). 
18 In other words, courts should not offer states the benefit of the doubt in this context. 
Deference in these cases, then, should work as a gloss that affects, but does not pre-
determine, the substantive constitutional inquiry. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial 
Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 2029, 2074-77 (2011).  
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responsible. The agencies, for their part, often lack the expertise and care to 
make sound decisions, and they fail to follow regularized procedures. In short, 
the breadth of the delegation is part of a larger array of administrative failings. 
It is worth noting that many of these problems apply not only to method of 
executions but to prison issues more generally. State departments of corrections 
are probably especially inexpert when it comes to lethal injection. After all, 
lethal injection requires a medicalized expertise that correctional departments 
manifestly lack. These departments, though, ostensibly can claim some genuine 
expertise over prison security, so one might think that their administrative 
pedigree would be sounder outside the lethal injection sphere. Perhaps it is, but 
sometimes only marginally. Prison officials sometimes make decisions with no 
transparency and little rhyme or reason, and the litany of prison abuses is vast 
and appalling.19 
Of course, some prisons are better than others, but there are plenty of 
horrific examples of serious human rights abuses by prisons and prison officials. 
These abuses, such as prolonged solitary confinement, often inflict grave 
physical and psychological harm while serving little or no penological value.  
Current laws like the Prison Litigation Reform Act make it difficult for 
inmates to successfully challenge prison conditions, but courts should recognize 
that those challenges implicate the administrative factors identified here. When 
prison officials act without oversight, accountability, expertise, and procedural 
regularity, they can violate their own institution’s rules and subject prisoners to 
needless suffering in ways that serve neither safety nor rehabilitative purposes. 
The problem is not usually that state legislatures have delegated authority over 
incarceration to prisons. State legislatures probably should provide clearer 
guidance to correctional departments and more statutory protections to inmates, 
but they necessarily will have to leave the business of prison administration to 
prison administrators. It is impossible to legislate instructions for every 
scenario. Rather, the problem is that many states delegated that authority for 
decades and then neglected the issues, unwilling to confront the fact that their 
prisons are needlessly dangerous and cruel places that often fail to protect their 
own inmates’ wellbeing or prepare them for life after incarceration.20 
Professor Klein’s excellent study of state nondelegation doctrine and 
execution practices calls important attention to the dangers of excessive, 
standardless delegation. In conjunction with some other relevant administrative 
 
 19 For especially disturbing accounts of prison arbitrariness and human rights abuses 
involving long-term solitary confinement, see generally KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN 
BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2016) and ALBERT 
WOODFOX, SOLITARY: MY STORY OF HOPE AND TRANSFORMATION (2019).   
 20 Professor Barkow makes a related point about separation of powers in the criminal 
context more generally.  
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inquiries, greater attention to those concerns can help shed much needed light 
both on the dangers of state execution protocols and also other failings of prisons 
and the criminal justice system more generally. Administrative details, 
seemingly petty and insignificant, can in fact be the building blocks for a more 
competent, fair government and a more just world. 
